Since the early seventies, when English translations of Jürgen Habermas’ principal works became available to English-speaking scholars, there has been a virtual “Habermas explosion” of research papers, dissertations and books. Informative and penetrating discussions already exist discussing Habermas’ encounter with positivism and his relationship to the “Frankfurt school.” There are however few detailed discussions of the theoretical relationships between Habermas’ project of a critical theory of society and Hegel’s system. We attempt to correct this previous omission in the following paper.The (...) central thesis of Jürgen Habermas’ Knowledge and Human Interests is that theoretical discourse is fundamentally tied to human experience. Habermas wishes to show that all theoretical statements about the world have their genesis in the experience of everyday life and practices. His particular understanding of this approach to the question of the possibility of knowledge has its origins in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The Phenomenology defines the development of knowledge in terms of a science of experience and must therefore constitute the main text in locating the philosophical parameters of Habermas’ thought. Our paper is an exercise in hermeneutics addressed to this task.In rejecting both Hegel’s philosophy of identity and Marx’s ontology of nature, Habermas has forced himself into a position where he must elaborate exactly how knowledge is possible at all. That is, the question which he confronts concerns the underlying basis of human experience. Hegel and Marx in Habermas’ opinion, were both unsuccessful in developing an adequate account of human life precisely because they tended to give an absolute basis to the the structure of the world. Knowledge itself, was considered as knowledge of something which existed beyond the scope of human control. Habermas attempts to overcome these difficulties by developing an explicitly ontological account of man through his theory of cognitive interests. Thus the process of reflection is ‘guided’ by certain cognitive interests. These interests perform the same function in Habermas’ system as does the notion of Geist in Hegel’s or Nature in Marx’s. They determine the conditions by which ‘knowledge’ can be generated and thus constitute the grounds upon which our world-view is constituted. (shrink)

Since the early seventies, when English translations of Jürgen Habermas’ principal works became available to English-speaking scholars, there has been a virtual “Habermas explosion” of research papers, dissertations and books. Informative and penetrating discussions already exist discussing Habermas’ encounter with positivism and his relationship to the “Frankfurt school.” There are however few detailed discussions of the theoretical relationships between Habermas’ project of a critical theory of society and Hegel’s system. We attempt to correct this previous omission in the following paper.The (...) central thesis of Jürgen Habermas’ Knowledge and Human Interests is that theoretical discourse is fundamentally tied to human experience. Habermas wishes to show that all theoretical statements about the world have their genesis in the experience of everyday life and practices. His particular understanding of this approach to the question of the possibility of knowledge has its origins in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. The Phenomenology defines the development of knowledge in terms of a science of experience and must therefore constitute the main text in locating the philosophical parameters of Habermas’ thought. Our paper is an exercise in hermeneutics addressed to this task.In rejecting both Hegel’s philosophy of identity and Marx’s ontology of nature, Habermas has forced himself into a position where he must elaborate exactly how knowledge is possible at all. That is, the question which he confronts concerns the underlying basis of human experience. Hegel and Marx in Habermas’ opinion, were both unsuccessful in developing an adequate account of human life precisely because they tended to give an absolute basis to the the structure of the world. Knowledge itself, was considered as knowledge of something which existed beyond the scope of human control. Habermas attempts to overcome these difficulties by developing an explicitly ontological account of man through his theory of cognitive interests. Thus the process of reflection is ‘guided’ by certain cognitive interests. These interests perform the same function in Habermas’ system as does the notion of Geist in Hegel’s or Nature in Marx’s. They determine the conditions by which ‘knowledge’ can be generated and thus constitute the grounds upon which our world-view is constituted. (shrink)

Is a simple refinement of the way we are living sufficient to address the environmental crisis? Is a wise use stance in which we produce and consume 'smarter' enough? This work not only answers no to the above question, but argues that a new way of life is already emerging---an ecological way of life. The ecological way of life is centered conceptually upon the ethical ideas first formulated in various policy documents, namely, that we are responsible to future generations in (...) terms of sharing this planet. The obligation to future generations follows from the formation of a new kind of transgenerational community that differs significantly from both immediate descendants and the posterity models for such communities. The reference to future generations undercuts the traditional US-THEM distinction and opens up a future-to-come in opposition to a future-present. The 'otherness' of future generations is emphasized with the result that our task is one of living within a disciplined not-knowing. This transgenerational community formed around future generations provides a framework for the ecological way of life by providing the ethical context for such environmental obligations as the precautionary principle. ;Given that the reference to future generations undercuts the traditional motivation provided by an US-THEM distinction, the experiential dimension of the environmental movement comes to the fore. How can people be motivated to sacrifice for those that come after, especially as they are not immediately identified with an Us? I examine an existential arena I labeled as 'living in the woods'. This space is an over-determined space of exile from the dominate culture that not only allows for social critique, but through the rediscovery of 'natural' rhythms and the experience of the beauty of a particular, provides an embodied experience of biophilia and of the earth as the fragile and vulnerable home of future generations. Not everyone has to 'life in the woods', but these experiences and reflections do provide, much as religious life in the monastery, an intense and articulated paradigm of a way of life for others. ;Finally, this dissertation was written for an intelligent, lay audience. The interconnections among environmental policies, political dynamics, and ethical concerns are all examined. (shrink)